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THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA: LAWYERS
WITHOUT LAW?
TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 2003
CONGRESSIONAL- EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA,

Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m.,
in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, John Foarde [staff
director] presiding.
Also present: David Dorman, deputy staff director; Tiffany
McCullen, for Under Secretary Grant Aldonas, Department of Commerce; Alison Pascale, office .of Senator Carl Levin; Keith Hand,
senior counsel; Selene Ko, chief counsel for trade and commercial
rule oflaw; Susan Weld, general counsel; and Andrea Worden, senI.
ior counsel.
Mr. FOARDE. Good afternoon to everyone. On behalf of Chainnan
Jim Leach and Co-Chairman Chuck Hagel of the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, welcome to this issues roundtable
on the Rule of Law in China. The United States-China Relations
Act of 2000 created the Commission and gave it the primary mandate of monitoring compliance with human rights and the development of the rule of law tn China.
Today we have as panelists three experts to give us their opinions as to how to translate these abstractions into pragmatic wnys
of evaluating the rapidly changing situation in China. We also hope
that they will be able to offer specific suggestions as to what kinds
of exchanges and cooperative efforts might be most effective in encouraging the development of the rule of law in China.
Our three panelists are Dr. James Feinennan, the James M.
Morita professor of Asian legal studies at Georgetown University
Law Center here in Washington; Randy Peerenboom, "pr~fessor of
law at the UCLA School of Law in Los Angeles; and Kaj Purohit,
the legislative director of the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights. Both Jim Feinennan and Raj have been our guests before
in the 107th Congress at hearings and roundtables of the Commission. So, welcome back. Randy, this is your first time. Welcome,
and thank you very much.
.
I think we will start with Jim Feinennan. And the way we work
this is that each panelist has 10 minutes to make an oral presentatio::. A.fter about 8 minutes, I will tell you when you have 2 minutes remaining. If you for some reason aren't able to make all of
the pointfl you would like to make, we can catch up with some of
them in the question and answer session.
(1)
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When all three of the panelists have spoken, we will go to ques- .
tions and answers. In the first instance, calling on our colleagues
who are personal staffers to our Commission members. In the second instance, to our own CECC staff colleagues, including the person who organized this particular roundtable.
So, without further ado, let me call on Jim Feinerman. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF JAMES V. FEINERMAN, JAMES M. MORITA
PROFESSOR OF ASIAN LEGAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNI·
VERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON DC

"
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Mr. F'EINERMAN. Thank you and thank the Commission and its
st&ff for having this session today, and inviting us to share our
views with you. I may have inadvertently set an agenda-I hope
not-for the rest of the spe~kers by sending out my paper title,
which is "Lawyers Without Lhw-Prosfects for the Rule of Law in
China after Deng Xiaoping." And I wil try in the time that I have
.
to sort of summarize my points.
Those of you who are familiar with the literature of Chinese legal
studies of the last 25 years will know that I was reversing the title
of a famous work by Victor Li, a former professor of law and president of the East-West Center in Hawaii, who wrote a book during
the Maoist era called "Law Without Lawyers." The thing that inspired me to twist Victor Li's words-if that is, in fact, what I am
doing-was that I thought that circumstances had changed so dramatically since the period that he wrote about when China boasted
of having no lawyers. Its legal system primarily consisted Qf using
some rather coercive, draconian methods that had the functions of
law to channel social behavior and control deviance.
I thought it was worth revisiting those ideas in the light of what
has happened in the intervening two and one-half decades. When
he wrote about Maoist China, Professor Li wanted to make clear
that there existed individuals and entities which functioned like
law and lawyers, despite the official lack of formal law and legal
institutions. Hence the title of his book, "Law Without Lawyers."
In the time that has passed since Li's book was published, I
think China has developed in ways that Victor Li himself would
not have predicted from the vantage point of the mid-1970s. The
death of Mao, the end of the Gang of Four, the accession of Deng
Xiaoping just a few years after his book was published, in fact, and
a reawakened interest in law or socialist legality. An old Soviet era
quip noted that socialist legality has the same relationship to legality as an electric chair has to a chair.
The law with Chinese socialist characteristics that has emer~ed
from that era, which began with a trickle of new Jaws, includmg
the first statutes that encouraged foreign investment in China's socialist economy became a flood of code and regulations today, even
case law that is reported and available to those of us in the West
who a few decades a~ would have killed for even a single
verifiable case report. The problem that we used to have, like
Soviet Union Kremlinologists of that era teasing intellectual mountains out of informational molehills, has been I reversed. We are
inundated with straightforward legal information in almQst unimaginable volume.
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So that for those like Professor Peerenboom and I who try to
teach courses in Chinese law, the idea of having what we hlld in
law school, a single course in Chinese law and holding oneself out
as an aU-p'urpose expert on every area of the Chinese legal system,
is impossible. It is necessary to specialize in, at the most, a few
areas and maybe even one area as the field grows.
It is this very volume of legal information that is now available
about China's legal system that led me to think that there maybe
is actually less there than meets the eye. So, turning Victor Li's
formulation around with apologies to some other legal specialists,
like David Trubek and John Merriman, who used this phraseology
before, I would like to argue that the "Lawyers Without Law" perhaps most accurately describes the current situation in the People's
Republic of China. Let me just quickly say what I mean.
All of the trappings are visible. They have all the accoutrements
of formal legality that were not present before. But, the crucial elements of a Rechtsstaat, a real rule oflaw, a meaningful rule of law,
I think are still missing. The incidentals are there, but the substance is not. I think that the operative rules of the system are
still, in many cases, buried elsewhere and not adequately described
by the fonnal legal system, which is what I set out in my paper.
In the end, I think you can manage to reconcile the view that
China has the embryonic beginnings of a legal system and, in fact,
has made great strides since the period that Victor Li wrote about,
and even compared to 10 years or 5 years ago. But, you have to
think about the relevance--or in some cases, the virtual irrelevance--of law in the formal codified version to make such a recoriciliation possible.
I think that the real explanation of how China works and what
the state does with regard to legal matters is still pretty much outside the formal legal system, although, hopefully by iterating and
reiterating the rule of law idea and talking ahout law, eventually
it may come to conform with the reality on the ground. In a few
sections, I try to deal with various issues to see how law and practice demonstrate my thesis, or rather how my thesis grows out of
the evidence that I have been looking at.
Finally, I look at the personal relationships or "guanxi," which
literally means connections in Chinese, for an alternative system
that more closely explains the operative nonns in Chinese society,
the real law, but not the la~ers' law. And so I will talk about just
very briefly the couple of thmgs that I looked at in the system of
foreign investment regulation, where there is perhaps one of the
largest bodies of law, which is of great interest to foreign investors
and to peo~le who are going to make significant contributions to
the economic devel~pment of Chinese society. Even there after two
decades, there are problems.
In fact, even today many invest.()rs rely on infonnal processes of
assurance by local officials, central officials when necessary, to
overcome various ~aps in the legislation. It is still the case that
very often authonties will retroactively revise legislation to assuage foreign investors fears, or to address criticism and failed
policies.
Even during an era of greater openness-some of it mandated by
China's recent accession to the World Trade Organization [WTO]-
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-there is a continuing significance for so-called "neibu"-internal or
unpublished-regulations. Eventually, these may all see the light
of print, but it's a difficult proce88 to draw it out. In many aspects,
foreign investment is governed by rules that foreign investors
themselves are still not allowed to see, and just must accept as applicable to them.
My colleagues in the human rights field justifiably have criticized
China's use of the rule of law to try to justify things such as the
crackdown on the Falun Gong, which is part of a broader ~vern
mental effort to control all organizations, religious, civil, SOCIal, and
economic. The use by these organizations of modern means of communication such as the Internet has made them especially threatening to the Chinese authoritia. The mechanisms that they use
follow the principles enunciate<l in China's Constitution, as well as
a number of lesser laws.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyers
Committee have all made pleas for institutional reforms, which I
think are neces~ in other areas including criminal justice.
Every year hundreds of thousands of people suffer human rights
violations due to the lack of legal safeguards, and the lack of independent bodies to prevent abuses, despite the formalization in two
rounds now-first criminal law and then criminal procedure law,
which were redrafted in the 1990s and si~cantly expanded. The
judiciary lacks independence and contmues to be subject to
political interference. There is evidence that torture is rife and
because of the system of administrative detention, anyone can be
detained by the police for a number of years without committing
any crime.
I know you have heard previous testimony about the implications
for human rights and the rule of law of China's HIV/AIDS crisis.
We are now confronting a new threat of communicable diseaSeSARS. And here again, the lack of transparency and the fundamental wues regarding that in China's ~~~m, which have obvious implications for law, also implicate C . a's ability to o~rate
with international authorities. Indeed China kept the World Health
Organization [WHO] officials who were stationed in Beijing from
going to the sites of infection in China for some time, even after
the evidence of the outbreak was quite clear. Somewhat in violation, I think, of China's commitments to that international organization, and of course, at great threat to the public health of
surrounding regions, and potentially the rest of the world.
Let me just close in the few moments that remain to talk a bit
about "guanxi," connections. This is the substitute in many ways
for law, and some ~ple say reflects the weak :n~ consciousness
on the part of the Chiriese 9stem, both among 0
ary individuals
and high-ranking officials. But, I think it alsO reflects the fact that
many promulgated laws are not widely publicized. Much of the Chinese population is unaware of their existence.
LoCal cadres, on the other hand, are used to creating law with
the stroke of their pens, or even the utterance of a single word.
Tbey have not been won over to a new system that threatens their
prerogatives and promises them very little in return. And as long
as the newly established legal institutions-such as courts, and
judges, and lawyers-remain untried and underdeveloped, it is un-
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derstandable that people tum back to the things with which they
are most familiar. And the thin¥s with which they are most familiar are these institutions of SOCIal connections. It is a complicated
issue in most societies and cultures, and it is particularly complicated and highly developed over millennia in China.
.
So, let me just say in conclusion, that this basic feature of personal relationships and connections between Chinese acts as a kind
of substitute. In fact, Mayfair Yang, one of the most astute students of the institution of "guanxi" in modem China, sees it as having a kind of oppo,sitional character, which explains its persistence,
even in the face of law. It is the informal organization's, or the
powerless individual's method of opposing or resisting formal or~a
nization. In many ways the behavior posits as its goal, opposition
to formal organizations and even opposition to authority and law.
As a result, I think as long as the operative norms of Chinese
society and many different strata continue to be the use of
"guanxi," there will be a continuing subversion of the elaborate regulations and system of law that is being developed on paper in the
People's Republic of China. Now in the end, I think that this can
be overcome, as it has been overcome in other East Asian societies,
including some ml\iority Chinese societies on the periphery of
mainland China. But, that is going to be the real test. The rule of
law is only an illusion of wishful thinking that contradicts the central reality, I think, of the last two decades of post-Mao China,
until it becomes clear that all of these institutions really function
in a meaningful way. And that's the test that I think the system
has yet to meet, yet to pass.
Mr. FOARDE. Jim, thank you very much.
Let's go right on to Randy Peerenboom. Speak right into the
mike, and everything will be fine.
STATEMENT OF RANDALL PEERENBOOM, PROFESSOR OF
LAW, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LOS ANGELES, CA
Mr. PEERENBOOM. I am very pleased and honored to be here

today. In these times of international conflict, the necessity of developing a positive, peaceful, and mutually beneficial relationship
with such an important country as China, I think, is obvious to us
all.
. However, if we are to develop that kind of relationship we need
to have a better understanding of how China sees its position in
the world and the challenges that it is facing in developing its
country and modernizing. Nowhere is this need for understanding
~ore apparent than with respect to the implementation of rule of
law, a notoriously contested concept here in the United States and
elsewhere in the world.
- So let me begin, then, by defining some terms in order to clarify
some areas of agreement and (iisagreement. I think it will also put
some of Jim'-s comments in context, because I think he raises issues
that point to very different kinds of concerns. So let me take it
from there.
Conceptions of rule of law generally come in two varieties. The
first kind is a "thin" conception that stresses the formal or instrumental aspects of rule of law, those features that any legal system
allegedly must possess to function effectively as a system of laws,

